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MENTAL HEALTH COURT JUDGES AS DYNAMIC
RISK MANAGERS: A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF THE ROLE OF JUDGES
Shauhin Talesh*
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense
ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty
sure to perish. The good remains the foundation on which new
structures will be built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the
laboratory of the years. Little by little the old doctrine is under-
mined. Often the encroachments are so gradual that their signifi-
cance is at first obscured. Finally we discover that the contour of
the landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be cast
aside, and the ground charted anew.1
INTRODUCTION
The most significant development in mental health law in the past
decade is the emergence of problem-solving courts that deal with
mentally ill individuals. Mental health courts are criminal courts that
divert people with serious mental illness into treatment programs
rather than jails or prisons.2 Mental health courts developed in re-
sponse to the rising number of people with severe mental illnesses
incarcerated in jails and prisons, the lack of treatment mentally ill in-
dividuals receive in carceral institutions, and the high likelihood that
mentally ill defendants will recidivate if untreated. 3 Three rationales
* Ph.D. cand. 2011, Jurisprudence & Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; Insur-
ance L.L.M., 2001, University of Connecticut; J.D., 2000, University of Connecticut; B.A., 1996,
University of California, Irvine. The author would like to thank Malcolm Feeley, Jonathan Si-
mon, Charles Weisselburg, John Monahan, Chrysanthi Leon, and Brent Nakamura for helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921).
2. See Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses:
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143, 143-44 (2002);
Derek Denckla & Greg Berman, Rethinking the Revolving Door: A Look at Mental Illness in the
Courts, Ctr. for Court Innovation 2 (2001). Carceral institutions, such as jails, where inmates are
typically housed either when arrested or convicted of small crimes with less than one year, and
prisons, where inmates with longer sentences for more serious offenses are housed, have long
struggled with problems associated with mentally ill persons.
3. See Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent? Comprehension in Mental
Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 605 (2005) (noting the factors that brought about
the creation of mental health courts); Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 2, at 143-45; COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT (June 2002);
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underlie mental health courts' therapeutic approaches: (1) when men-
tally ill individuals commit criminal acts, deterrent or punitive crimi-
nal sanctions, are neither effective, nor morally appropriate; (2) legal
processes can be reshaped in ways that improve the psychological
functioning and emotional well-being of mentally ill defendants; and
(3) addressing the underlying mental illness that contributes to the
criminal act increases public safety and decreases the likelihood of re-
cidivism.4 Through a collaborative, team-oriented approach, judges
use a range of flexible responses, treatment programs, and close moni-
toring plans to reduce the risk of recidivism. 5
Scholars often describe problem-solving court judges as activists. 6
This analysis is correct. Prior analysis has failed, however, to establish
a framework for understanding how problem-solving court judges be-
have in ways that are different from our traditional conception of an
activist judge who seeks to define and protect public values.7 Mental
health court judges do something more: they manage risk.
Risk is an intuitive and innate element in society.8 It is the uncer-
tainty about what the future will bring, not potential adverse events,
which make life full of risk.9 In response to this uncertainty, human
beings, private organizations, and governments attempt to increase
Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers: Special Report, U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE STATS., at 1 (July 1999). In particular, over one-fourth of the inmates with
mental illnesses in local jails are incarcerated for a public order offense. Id. at 4.
4. See Bernstein & Seltzer. supra note 2, at 148. The rationale is that many individuals ar-
rested for quality-of-life offenses suffer from mental illnesses and would not commit these of-
fenses but for the mental illness. Also, mentally ill offenders often lack the mens rea component
of culpability.
5. Id.
6. For a compelling argument that explains why problem-solving judges and, in particular,
drug court judges are activists, see JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERI-
CAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 94-99 (2001). "Instead, the drug court judge is, on a number of
fronts, an activist judge." Id. at 94. For further discussion on problem-solving courts as activist,
see Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV.
82, 83 (2006) (noting that problem-solving courts "have largely repudiated the classical virtues of
restraint, disinterest, and modesty, replacing these features of the traditional judicial role with
bold, engaged, action-oriented norms"); Joshua Matt, Jurisprudence and Judicial Roles in Massa-
chusetts Drug Courts, 30 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 151, 151-52 (2004) (noting
that the primary evaluation of problem-solving judges is as activists).
7. Owen M. Fiss. Foreward, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (noting that the
judge's function is to give concrete meaning and application to public values through the process
of adjudication).
8. See DAVID A. Moss, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MAN-
AGER 1 (2002) ("[R]isk management constitutes a potent and pervasive form of public policy in
the United States. Our economy would be unrecognizable in its absence. It is even possible that
the economy would not function at all.").
9. Id. at 22.
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certainty and stability while reducing risk. Scholars study risk man-
agement (that is, the ability to evaluate, reduce, and control risk) in a
variety of areas, including public safety regulation, property insurance,
products liability, criminal justice, accidents, commercial enterprise, fi-
nancial management, and politics.10 However, risk management has
not been traditionally framed or analyzed as a function of the judici-
ary. This is the first Article of which the author is aware that exposes
and expands the conceptual frame of reference for risk management
to the judicial sphere.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue for or against judges
taking on risk management functions."' Rather, this Article recog-
nizes and understands how judges take on this important role in a
particular type of specialty court. More importantly, this analysis
moves scholarly attention away from the traditional debate of the
judge's role as a "passive, neutral arbiter" versus "activist" and toward
examination of how risk management approaches by judges play a
growing role in the criminal court process.
Part II of this Article describes the "transinstitutionalization" of
mentally ill individuals and traces how they went from state hospitals
to state jails and prisons over the past fifty years. 12 It also explains
how transinstitutionalization resulted in a revolving door phenome-
non, whereby defendants cycled in and out of the criminal justice sys-
tem for minor, quality-of-life offenses without receiving treatment for
their illnesses. 13
Part III explores risk management and the role of the risk man-
ager. 14 In particular, risk management has three components: (1)
identifying risk by conducting a risk assessment; (2) measuring and
evaluating risk in order to implement a plan; and (3) handling risk
through monitoring. The risk manager's objective is not to eliminate
risk, but to control, manage, minimize, and reallocate it.15 In order to
10. See generally Moss, supra note 8 (noting various ways risk is managed in society). For a
comprehensive explanation of the various ways in which risk management has been studied and
critiqued, see JIM BANNISTER, How TO MANAGE RISK (2d ed. 1997).
11. For a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of having mental health courts, see Susan
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. Pun. POL'Y & L.
507 (2005).
12. See infra notes 23-72 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 73-118 and accompanying text.
15. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26 (1970) (noting "as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce
the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents"); Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1028 n.2 (1990) ("[T]he
distribution of risk-demographically, spatially, and temporally-also has to be considered,
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better understand how these roles are performed, Part III analyzes
how psychiatrists manage the risk of patients with suicidal ideations.
Next, Part IV explains what a mental health court is, how it functions,
and how mental health judges perform their roles differently from a
traditional judge. 16 In particular, judges facilitate a collaborative,
team-oriented approach unique to each individual defendant. 17
Part V argues that mental health court judges are "dynamic risk
managers. '"18 Rather than simply processing cases and perpetuating
the revolving door, judges manage risk, attempt to resolve the under-
lying mental illness, and attempt to heal the defendant. Specifically,
with the assistance of team members-including the public defender,
prosecutor, and behavioral and mental health specialists-the judge
performs the following three tasks: (1) he conducts a risk assessment
in which he evaluates the defendant's potential to harm himself and
the public; (2) he evaluates and implements a treatment plan designed
to manage and reallocate the defendant's risk; and (3) he monitors the
risk over a period of time, often requiring frequent return visits by the
defendant. 19
Part VI analyzes how dynamic risk management in mental health
courts affects defendants. 20 When managing risk, mental health court
judges function as hybrid social workers (diagnosing and implement-
ing a plan) and probation officers (monitoring the offender to ensure
compliance). When functioning in its ideal form, the collaborative,
team-oriented approach of mental health courts shifts the focus of the
criminal process toward healing and away from punishment. 21
Part VII concludes that, although risk management techniques may
have always been embedded in judges' roles, it is now becoming more
overtly a part of the judicial routine. Thus, as Cardozo noted many
years ago, mental health court judges are changing the "contour of the
partly for reasons of justice and partly because distribution has a bearing on the measure of risk
costs that one might hope to minimize."). Though risk and cost minimization are important ends
of risk management, they are not the only ones.
16, See infra notes 119-174 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 175-199 and accompanying text.
19. Id. See also JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 122 (Bruce Winick & David Wexler eds..
2003).
20. See infra notes 200-233 and accompanying text.
21. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992) (framing this new ap-
proach as the New Penology); Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon. Actuarial Justice: The Emerg-
ing New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY (David Nelkin ed., 1994); Jonathan
Simon & Malcolm Feeley. True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime, in
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON MESSINGER 147 (Thomas
G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds.. 1995).
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landscape," casting aside "old maps," and "charting" new approaches
to judges' roles. 22
II. THE RISING POPULATION OF INCARCERATED MENTALLY ILL
INDIVIDUALS AND THE REVOLVING DOOR
Before analyzing what risk management is and how mental health
court judges employ risk management techniques, it is important to
understand how and why such a large number of mentally ill individu-
als cycle in and out of the criminal justice system. This Part briefly
traces the transinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, that is, how the
mentally ill went from being confined in state hospitals to passing in
and out of state jails and prisons over the past fifty years.23 Section A
discusses the growing mentally ill population in prisons. 24 Section B
examines the reasons for transinstitutionalization. 25 Finally, Section C
explores mental illness in prisons. 26
A. The Growing Mentally Ill Population in Jails and Prisons
As incarceration rates increased over the last twenty-five years, the
number of people with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system
also steadily increased. 27 By 2005, "more than half of all prison and
jail inmates had a mental health problem, including 705,600 inmates in
state prisons, 78,800 in federal prisons, and 479,900 in local jails.
These estimates represented 56% of state prisoners, 45% of federal
prisoners, and 64% of jail inmates. ' 28 The number of mentally ill indi-
22. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 178. See infra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
23. See Emerging Judicial Strategies for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Caseload: Mental
Health Courts in Fort Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernadino, and Anchorage, U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE 1-3 (April 2000) (highlighting the plight of the mentally
ill in jails and prisons) [hereinafter Emerging Judicial Strategies]. However, this Article limits its
focus to the past fifty years.
24. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
27. See RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (1922) (noting the rise
of mentally ill persons in the prison system); Am. Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards (1989); Am. Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (1989); Emerging
Judicial Strategies, supra note 23, at 1-3.
28. Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates:
Special Report, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS. 1 (Sept. 2006, rev'd Dec.,
2006). Prior studies noted that approximately 16% of people in state jails and prisons have a
reported or diagnosed mental illness. See John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obliga-
tions and Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 447, 452-53 (2005); Nicholas Freudenberg, Jails,
Prisons, and the Health of Urban Populations: A Review of the Impact of the Correctional System
on Community Health, 78 J. URBAN HEALTH 214, 217, 220 (2001); Ditton, supra note 3; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 17
(2003) [hereinafter ILL-EQuIPPED].
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viduals placed in American jails every year is approximately 700,000.29
Compared with non-incarcerated individuals of similar age in the
United States, prisoners are two-to-four times more likely to suffer
from a psychotic illness or major depression and approximately ten
times more likely to have an antisocial personality disorder.30 The in-
cidence of schizophrenia in state jails is two-to-three times higher than
in the general population.31 Additionally, the incidence of schizophre-
nia is three-to-five times higher in state prisons than in the general
population.32 These numbers demonstrate why jails and prisons have
been referred to as the "new asylum."' 33 These figures reflect the
number of people who report their mental illness or are diagnosed as
mentally ill by a jail or prison, There are many more incarcerated
persons whose mental illness goes unreported and undiagnosed. 34
B. The Pathway to Transinstitutionalization
There are multiple reasons for the high number of mentally ill indi-
viduals in carceral institutions, but two reasons remain at the fore-
front: the long-term effects of de-institutionalization and law
enforcement strategies that target drug and low-level, quality-of-life
offenses. According to Greg Berman and Derek Denckla, "[d]e-insti-
tutionalization is a term that describes a systematic shift in resources
for treating people with mental illness-from large, residential, state-
run psychiatric hospitals to community-based treatment. ' 35 The avail-
ability of psychiatric medications has increased tremendously since
the 1950s. This led doctors to treat many mentally ill individuals on an
outpatient basis. 36 In the 1960s and 1970s, civil libertarians and legis-
29. See Freudenberg, supra note 28, at 220; Jacobi, supra note 28, at 452-53.
30. See Seena Fazel & John Danesh, Serious Mental Disorder in 23,000 Prisoners: A Systemic
Review of 62 Surveys, 359 THE LANCET 545, 548 (2002).
31. See Jacobi, supra note 28, at 453.
32. Id. (citing NAT'L COMM N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE HEALTH STATUS OF
SOON-TO-BE RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, VOL. 1. 25-26 (March 2002) [here-
inafter NCCHC REPORT]); see also NCCHC REPORT, supra, 15-28 (Mar. 2002). In fact, the
NCCHC reports that 2.3% to 3.9% of state prison inmates have schizophrenia or another
psychotic disorder, between 13.1% and 18.6% have a major depressive disorder, and another
2.1% to 4.3% have a bipolar disorder. Id. at 25. "NAMI (formerly known as the National
Alliance for the Mentally I11) reported in 1999 that the number of inmates with mental illness in
prison was three times that of the number of non-incarcerated people hospitalized with such
illnesses." Joyce Kosak, Comment, Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 397 (2005).
33. Michael Weissberg, Chained in the Emergency Department: The New Asylum for the Poor,
42 Hosp. & COMM. Psy. 3, 317-19 (1991).
34. See Jacobi, supra note 28, at 453.
35. See Denckla & Berman supra note 2, at 2. See also PHIL BROWN. THE TRANSFER OF
CARE: PSYCHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 76-86, 133-41 (1985).
36. Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 2.
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lative reformers led a movement toward offering proper treatment in
the least restrictive environment possible. 37 In particular, civil com-
mitment statutes made it harder for judges to place a person with a
mental illness in a psychiatric hospital against that person's will.38
These laws diverted larger numbers of people with mental illness into
the community. The goal of civil libertarians and legislative reformers
was to replace confinement with coercive attempts within the commu-
nity to create therapeutic interventions.
These reformers unintentionally restricted access to mental health
systems. In particular, many states closed or downsized their psychiat-
ric hospitals without funding community treatment centers. 39 Thus,
although the mentally ill were living in the community, they often
lacked proper treatment facilities, support programs, or medication.
Berman and Denckla noted that "[in 1955, there were 560,000 indi-
viduals hospitalized with mental illness in the United States. By 1999,
there were less than 80,000. '' 40 Over the past thirty years, while the
number of mentally ill individuals in state psychiatric facilities de-
creased, the number of mentally ill individuals in prisons rose at a
staggering rate.41 The simultaneous increase in imprisonment of peo-
ple with mental illnesses and decrease of mentally ill people in mental
hospitals is referred to as transinstitutionalization. 42
Transinstitutionalization coincided with stricter law enforcement
strategies. Increasingly stringent law enforcement placed an emphasis
on enforcing quality-of-life offenses, such as shoplifting, illegal street
vending, prostitution, trespassing, loitering, and low-level drug posses-
sion.43 This increased the probability that law enforcement would cor-
37. Id. See also Gary E. Whitmer, From Hospitals to Jails: The Fate of California's Deinstitu-
tionalized Mentally Ill, 50 AM. J. oF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65-75 (1980) (noting a similar process);
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned Deadly, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1998, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/Article2.htm.
38. See Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 2.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. "By contrast, since 1970, the U.S. jail and prison populations have increased fivefold to a
total of about 1.6 million people." Id. (citation omitted).
42. See John A. Talbott, Deinstitutionalization: Avoiding the Diseases of the Past, 30 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 621, 622-24 (1979), reprinted in 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1112,
1112-15 (2004) (explaining the process of transinstitutionalization). Also, transinstitutionaliza-
tion was enlarged by the dramatic rise in homeless populations during the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, which quite often consisted of a large mentally ill population. See Emerging Judicial Strat-
egies, supra note 23, at 2.
43. See Emerging Judicial Strategies, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that the War on Drugs, strict
enforcement of quality-of-life offenses, and the rise in homeless population caused police of-
ficers to arrest large numbers of mentally ill offenders); see also Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts
in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 851,
855-56 (1997) (noting that officers often arrest mentally ill individuals for quality-of-life of-
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ral mentally ill individuals-especially homeless mentally ill
individuals-into the criminal justice system for minor offenses.44
One study noted that, during street encounters, police officers were
almost twice as likely to arrest someone who appeared to have a
mental illness.45 Approximately half of incarcerated mentally ill indi-
viduals are arrested for non-violent offenses, such as trespassing and
disorderly conduct. 46 Also, a large number of people arrested as a
result of the war on drugs during the 1980s suffered from mental
illnesses. 47
Thus, over the course of the last forty years, mentally ill individuals
went from being treated in mental hospitals to being warehoused in
prisons. The libertarian view of community-based mental health
treatment prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a view of the
mentally ill as dangerous and high risk in the 1980s and 1990s, particu-
larly because the attempt to deinstitutionalize mental health treat-
ment by using more community treatment centers never fully came to
fruition. During the 1980s and 1990s, the media often shaped public
perception of mentally ill individuals as dangerous by spotlighting ran-
dom acts of violence in the community. 48 Those suffering from co-
occurring disorders (for instance, drug addiction and mental illness)
were typically viewed as even more dangerous. 49 Popular legislation
favored civil commitment proceedings as a method of containing men-
tally ill defendants, even after they completed their sentences. The
public's increasingly negative perception of mentally ill individuals co-
incided with increases in zero-tolerance policies and arrests for qual-
ity-of-life offenses. The result was jail and prison populations filled
with mentally ill individuals.
fenses, creating a revolving door of mentally ill patients cycling in and out of the criminal justice
system).
44. See Emerging Judicial Strategies, supra note 23, at 2.
45. Linda A. Teplin, Keeping the Peace: Police Discretion and Mentally Ill Persons, NAT. INST.
OF JUST. J. 12 (July 2000) (explaining a Chicago study of thousands of police encounters, which
concluded that 47% of people with a mental illness were arrested, whereas only 28% of individu-
als without a mental illness were arrested for the same behavior).
46. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 2, at 145.
47. Id.
48. See Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk. 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 587,
589-90 (2005) (noting that fear of mentally ill individuals is often aggravated by media portrayals
of occasional violent behavior by mentally ill people).
49. For an evaluation of the high volume of offenders suffering co-occurring disorders, see
Karen M. Abram & Linda A. Teplin, Co-Occurring Disorders Among Mentally Ill Jail Detainees:
Implications for Public Policy. 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1036 (1991).
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C. The Revolving Door
Prisons offer mentally ill people insufficient treatment. A Septem-
ber 2006 report released by the Bureau of Justice concerning state and
federal inmates with mental illnesses found the following: (1) state
prisoners had the highest rate of mental health treatment since admis-
sion (34%), followed by federal prisoners (23%), and jail inmates
(17%); (2) taking a prescribed medication for a mental health prob-
lem was the most common type of treatment mentally ill inmates re-
ceived since admission to prison or jail; (3) approximately 27% of
state prisoners, 19% of federal prisoners, and 15% of mentally ill jail
inmates used prescribed medication for a mental problem since admis-
sion; and (4) only 5% of state prisoners, 3% of federal prisoners, and
2% of prisoners in local jails stayed overnight in a hospital for a
mental problem, making an overnight stay in a hospital the least likely
method of treatment.50 The inadequate treatment of mental illness by
prisons is due to a number of factors, including "lack of funding, inad-
equate staffing to meet the needs of the entire prison population, lack
of training for the health care and security staff, and lack of proce-
dures to identify and track the needs of prisoners."'s
In July 2006, the care provided to mentally ill prisoners in California
was so inadequate that Federal District Court Judge Lawrence
Karlton ordered California to hire more than 550 new mental health
care staff.5 2 Similarly, a recent report in Oklahoma offered a disheart-
ening view of the warehousing of the mentally ill in prisons:
The most unstable inmates are housed in 'Fantasy Island,' the nick-
name for the acute-care unit. Surrounded by a 12 foot fence, it's a
prison within a prison for 108. The walls, made of unbreakable
glass, allow staff to see most of the unit at a glance. There is a four-
point restraint table where uncontrollable inmates can be tied down
until they're calm. With temperatures in the teens one day earlier
this year, few inmates ventured outside. Many milled around a rec-
reation area in the zombie-like gait of the heavily medicated.
Others, visibly agitated, paced back and forth and stared through
the glass. Those considered too unpredictable and uncontrollable
ever to be free are locked behind thick doors with small windows.
50. James & Glaze, supra note 28, at 9.
51. Kosak, supra note 32, at 400; ILL-EQuIPPED, supra note 28, at 94-127 (noting problems in
treatment).
52. James Sterngold, U.S. Judge Tells State to Hire Prison Mental Health Staff, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 1, 2006, at B-3. Sterngold reported that the special master appointed by Judge Karlton
indicated that the prison suicide rate was soaring because of poor mental health treatment. Id.
2007]
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Screams, moans, and chanting are normal. The noise level rises as
the sun goes down and before the medication kicks in. 53
Additionally the criminal justice system devotes insufficient attention
to reintegrating mentally ill individuals into society upon completion
of their sentences. Thus, those with mental illnesses do not leave
prison or jail any more stable than when they entered. Their condi-
tions often worsen and increase the likelihood of recidivism.
Because of the lack of treatment prisoners receive, it is not surpris-
ing that many offenders cycle in and out of the criminal justice system,
as if the system were a revolving door. 54 Almost 50% of mentally ill
prisoners in the federal system have three or more prior probations,
incarcerations, or arrests, compared with 28% without mental ill-
nesses. 55 Family members indicate the average number of arrests for
relatives with mental illness is more than three.5 6 As mental health
court Judge Stephen Manley of Santa Clara County noted:
I've worked with mental health clients for years and I know our
traditional method is to ignore them. We either cycle them through
quickly or we give them long sentences. There's a stigma with the
mentally ill that they are more dangerous, which is not true. Some
are, some are not. They are, however, far more difficult to work
with. It makes absolutely no sense in my view to warehouse some-
one who is mentally ill and release them into the community with
no services, when we know they will be rearrested again and go
right back into jail. 57
In short, mentally ill individuals cycle from the street, to court, to jail
or prison, and back to the street, only to repeat this cycle. 58
In traditional criminal court, cases involving mentally ill defendants
are processed just like any other.5 9 Because a significant number of
low-level public order offenses involve the mentally ill, these cases are
53. Gary Fields, No Way Out: Trapped by Rules, the Mentally Ill Languish in Prison, WALL
ST. J., May 3, 2006, at 1A.
54. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 856 (describing the revolving door dilemma in the criminal
justice system).
55. See Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 4.
56. See id.
57. Interview with Judge Stephen Manley, Mental Health Treatment Court, Santa Clara
County, Ctr. for Court Innovation (Jan. 2005), available at http://courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Document.viewDocument&documentID=618&documentTopicID=25&document
TypeID=8.
58. "[O]ur jails and prisons are so filled, riddled, with the mentally ill that you can start with
almost any subset." Interview with Judge Morris, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health Courts,
Ctr. for Court Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
collab/documents/transcripts.pdf.
59. See Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that mental health offenders are often
processed the same way as other defendants).
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typically resolved via plea bargain. 60 Judges often play a limited role,
simply moving the case through the system. 61 This is consistent with
the traditional adversarial model of the judge as neutral and passive. 62
Under this model, "judges are not supposed to have an involvement
or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disengagement and
dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly and impar-
tially."' 63 In most criminal cases, including those involving mentally ill
defendants, the judge is on the sidelines, while the prosecutor and the
defense attorney plea bargain. 64 Consider the following evaluation of
the criminal process:
Many state court judges have reported that the pressure of process-
ing hundreds of cases each day has transformed their courtrooms
into 'plea bargain mills' which place the highest value on disposing
of the maximum number of cases in the minimum amount of time.
Additionally, they bemoan their lack of tools-both information
and sentencing options-for responding to the complexities of drug
addiction, mental illness and domestic violence cases. Chief Justice
Kathleen Blatz of Minnesota neatly summarized the feelings of
many judges: 'Judges are very frustrated .... The innovation that
we're seeing now is a result of judges processing cases like a vegeta-
ble factory. Instead of cans of peas, you've got cases. You just
move 'em, move 'em, move 'em. One of my colleagues on the
bench said, 'You know, I feel like I work for McJustice: we sure
aren't good for you, but we are fast.' 65
The traditional criminal justice system fails to address the underlying
problems that cause recidivism. To the extent that mentally ill defend-
ants pose a risk to themselves or others, little emphasis is placed on
decreasing or controlling the risk of recidivism.66
There are three principal effects of short sentence and quality-of-
life offenses for mentally ill defendants: (1) the risk of recidivism for
mentally ill defendants remains high upon release; (2) the likelihood
that the condition will continue and possibly worsen during incarcera-
tion is high; and (3) the likelihood that the community will be safer is
low, because these offenders are often released without receiving any
treatment.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (not-
ing that the role of the judge is to act as a passive arbiter for actual disputes).
63. Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982).
64. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 77.
65. Id.
66. See Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 125, 129 (2004) (highlighting the lack of focus on outcomes under the traditional
system).
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In response to these problems, Congress enacted America's Law
Enforcement and Mental Health Project Act in 2000 ("Act"). 67 The
goal of the Act is to improve access to mental health services for juve-
nile and adult non-violent offenders and reduce the incarceration and
recidivism rates of mentally ill individuals. 68 By linking mental health
services and support, the Act sought to prevent arrests of mentally ill
people. 69 Specifically, the Act authorized federal funds for states and
counties to develop mental health courts and diversion programs. 70
Congressional findings issued in the Mentally Ill Offender and Crime
Reduction Act of 2004 indicated that most mentally ill prisoners suc-
cessfully respond to intervention that integrates treatment, rehabilita-
tion, and support services. 71
Because mental health courts have only existed since 2000, there is
little research on their processes and cases. 72 As this Article shows,
however, mental health court judges are not acting as impartial arbi-
ters, but as dynamic risk managers. Before this Article fully explores
this new framework for reconceptualizing the judge's role, it is impor-
tant to understand the fundamentals of risk management.
III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK MANAGEMENT
This Part explores risk management and the risk manager's role. In
particular, it explains that, in order to manage, minimize, and reallo-
cate risk, risk managers perform three main functions: (1) assessing
risk; (2) evaluating and measuring risk; and (3) controlling risk. 73 In
order to show risk management functions in practice, this Part exam-
ines how psychiatrists manage the risk of patients with suicidal ide-
ations.74 This approach is similar to that taken by judges in mental
health courts and, therefore, provides a logical reference point.75
67. Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (2000).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414
§ 2(6), 118 Stat. 2327 (2004).
72. See Allison D. Redlich et al., The Second Generation of Mental Health Courts, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 527. 527 (2005) ("Empirical data, both evaluative and outcome,
remain sparse despite [mental health courts] growth.").
73. See infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. Although there are multiple approaches to managing the risk of suicidal patients, this Part
highlights a routine approach.
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A. What is Risk Management?
In its most basic form, risk management is any activity designed to
either reduce or reallocate risk. 76 It is an attempt to increase certainty
and, therefore, stability by reducing risk. 77 Risk management is typi-
cally viewed as a compilation of techniques employed in flexible and
coordinated ways.78 More precisely, "[i]t is essentially a multi-discipli-
nary process where different skills and disciplines are brought to-
gether in risk problem solving. '79 Typically, risk management
becomes necessary when a company, organization, or person is con-
cerned about a particular risk.80 Managing risk for a company is an
"all-embracing task. t81 Using a top-down approach, risk management
teams are structured with a single risk manager who acts as a chief
executive and, through his team, makes the ultimate management de-
cisions for the company.8 2
B. How do Risk Managers Manage Risk?
Risk managers' jobs include recognizing risks, implementing plans
to control risks, and monitoring risks so that their managing strategies
are successful. 83 The ultimate goal is to identify and assess the risks
and reduce the chances of negative consequences. 84 Evaluation and
measurement consist of the risk manager using the assessment to esti-
mate the probability and possible severity of the risk occurrence. 85
During this process, the manager attempts to develop a plan to miti-
gate the risk.86 Finally, once a plan is in place, the manager attempts
to control and monitor the risk. 87
The specific risk management approach depends on the risk in-
volved. Many organizations manage risk. The government manages
76. Moss, supra note 8, at 1.
77. Darwin B. Close, Teaching Principles of Insurance and Risk by the Contract Method, 41 J.
OF RISK & INs. 719 (1974) (explaining the risk calculus involved in managing risk).
78. BANNISTER. supra note 10, at 2, 285.
79. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
80. See id. (noting that the precise reason for risk management is often dependent on the
company, but the ultimate goal is to reduce risk).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. For a compendium of risk management strategies employed, including an analysis of risk
management's major tasks, see BANNISTER, supra note 10, at 1-25, 277-92.
84. Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed to Toxic Sub-
stances, 14 J.L. & PoL'v 39, 54-55 n.40 (2006). "[R]isk assessors' goal is to reduce risks to ac-
ceptably low levels, the technical definition of safe levels." Id. at 54.
85. See Bannister, supra note 10, at 1-22.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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public risks, such as nuclear power plants, dangerous products, and
public health risks like pollution. 88 Families manage private risks,
such as finances.8 9 Although the specific risks are different, the man-
agement approach is often the same.90
For example, a corporate risk manager's first task is to identify and
assess the risk by preparing a risk profile. 91 A risk profile analyzes a
company's risk position in order to identify the possible financial, le-
gal, and political exposures. 92 Next, during the evaluation stage, the
risk manager formulates a series of key risk management objectives
and conducts an audit of present risk management capability. 93 For
example, if a car manufacturer is worried about a safety hazard, it
might implement a recall plan in order to avoid a loss. Finally, during
the control stage, the risk manager defines the responsibilities of the
management team members, trains those involved in risk manage-
ment, and establishes a system for monitoring the effectiveness of the
risk management plan.94
C. What Qualities do Successful Risk Managers Have?
Successful risk managers possess several qualities, including pa-
tience, an open mind, a willingness to address problems, an under-
standing personality, the ability to be friendly but firm, and the ability
to quickly learn and digest important information. 95 Risk manage-
ment systems analysts note that these qualities typically manifest
themselves in the form of superior understanding, practical ability,
and communication skills.96 Risk managers must balance these skills
88. See generally Moss, supra note 8 (evaluating how different government entities manage
risk).
89. Id.
90. Id. See generally BANNISTER, supra note 10.
91. BANNISTER, supra note 10, at 286 (analyzing the factors involved in managing risk for a
company).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 21-23 (detailing the "value added" qualities successful risk managers have). Con-
sider one commentator's analysis of what these attributes mean in the context of risk
management:
Superior understanding is likely to come from more careful analysis and particular mul-
tidisciplinary or many-sided analysis. Often it replaces a dogmatic one-sided view by a
more perceptive examination of why risks are not seen in advance. It may be due to
over-familiarity or lack of broader vision. The missing factor is often, but not always,
an understanding of human behavior.
Superior practical ability will come from various sources. It can be either through
study, or from looking at the problem in various circumstances and from various view-
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with realistic potential costs and benefits. 97 Regardless of whether
one manages a public or private risk, risk managers rely heavily on
meticulous, patient investigation and research in order to understand
the risk and why it exists. 98
D. Risk Management of Patients with Suicidal Ideations
This Part evaluates the manner in which clinical psychiatrists man-
age the risk of suicidal patients who warrant inpatient treatment. Typ-
ically, "[s]uicidal behaviors are behaviors that are correlated with a
range of psychiatric, psychological, biological, social, and cognitive
disorders and dysfunctions. "99 Suicidal patients often suffer from
Axis I-IV mental disorders.100 Thus, analyzing how doctors manage
suicidal patients provides a useful comparison point for evaluating
mental health courts.10'
In Risk Management with Suicidal Patients, the authors analyzed
how clinicians manage risk when treating suicidal patients. 10 2 Manag-
ing this risk is challenging, because suicidal behavior is often not only
based on mental illness, but is coupled with "impulsive, irrational, un-
predictable, situationally based, reactive, reactionary, or opportunis-
tic" behavior. 03 As a result, the clinician's goal is to reasonably
points. It might result from wider or more varied experience and especially from lots of
practice in different circumstances.
Superior communication skills are likely to result from the ability to feel about the
problem like the person being taught, the effective use of example and illustration and
lively and interesting presentation.
Id. at 21-22.
97. BANNISTER, supra note 10, at 22.
98. See id. (chronicling the diverse approaches private risk managers must employ); Moss,
supra note 8 (explaining the diverse tasks public risk managers must complete in order to be
successful).
99. Morton M. Silverman et al., Inpatient Standards of Care and the Suicidal Patient: Part II,
An Integration with Clinical Risk Management, in RISK MANAGEMENT WITH SUICIDAL PATIENTS
94 (Bruce Bongar et al. eds., 1998).
100. Andrew Edmund Slaby, Outpatient Management of Suicidal Patients, in RISK MANAGE-
MENT WITH SUICIDAL PATIENTS 34-36 (Bruce Bongar et al. eds., 1998) (noting that suicidal per-
sons often suffer from depression, chemical imbalance, and schizophrenia). The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association provides criteria
and a classification system for diagnosing mentally ill individuals into Axis levels. Axis I consists
of clinical disorders, such as schizophrenia, major depression, substance-related disorders, and
anxiety disorders; Axis II disorders consist of mental retardation and personality disorders; Axis
III consists of general medical conditions; and Axis IV consists of psychological and environ-
mental problems. See The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, available at
http://dsmivtr.org (last visited July 25, 2007).
101. In some respects, persons with suicidal thoughts reflect the most serious dimension of
mental illness, because they are on the brink of taking their own lives.
102. Silverman, supra note 99, at 106.
103. See id.
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reduce the risk of suicidal behavior. 10 4 When administering inpatient
treatment, the doctor makes an assessment, implements a treatment
plan, and monitors patients. 10 5 "At every point in the clinical assess-
ment, treatment and management of a suicidal inpatient, the clinician
is faced with risk management decisions, beginning with the initial de-
cision to hospitalize the patient."'10 6
Clinicians working in inpatient settings with suicidal patients use
four principles to guide their risk management efforts: "(1) attention
to therapeutic alliance; (2) regular assessment of the patient's compe-
tencies and capabilities for cooperation and collaboration with the
treatment plan; (3) consultation with other clinicians and specialists;
and (4) documentation of significant information and decisions in the
patient's record."' 0 7 Treatment involves the collaboration of the treat-
ment team-the clinician, hospital staff, and hospital administration.
1. Assessment
In addition to thorough evaluations of suicidal patients, clinical as-
sessment is based on prior experience, knowledge, and training. 0 8 In
order to classify mentally ill individuals into Axis levels, doctors must
master and correctly apply the criteria derived from the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiat-
ric Association. 10 9 Clinicians perform assessments by relying on
clinical experience, facts, observations, and secondary information. 110
Clinicians thoroughly review patients' histories and determine
whether they present a suicide risk."' Because treating suicidal pa-
tients is highly individualized and the circumstances behind suicidal
ideations are unique to the individual, clinicians do not rely heavily on
actuarial assessments. After evaluating subjective and objective crite-
ria, clinicians assess risks based on "the foreseeability of the patient's
course of behavior or disorder. The clinical decision itself is a mediat-
ing variable, having both its own set of consequences (which are not
always foreseeable or predictable) and a consequent effect on the pa-
104. See id.
105. See id. at 89.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 105.
108. Silverman, supra note 99, at 106.
109. Wendy L. Packman & Eric A. Harris, Legal Issues and Risk Management in Suicidal
Patients, in RISK MANAGEMENT WITH SUICIDAL PATIENTS 166-67 (Bruce Bongar et al. eds..
1998).
110. See Silverman, supra note 99, at 88.
111. See Packman & Harris, supra note 109, at 166. The fact that the patient is in the hospital
as opposed to receiving outpatient care means the risk factors are higher.
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tient's behavior and prognosis."' 12 The clinician's role is dynamic, be-
cause treatment decisions are constantly reviewed, adjusted, and
recalibrated depending on the increase or decrease in the risk posed
by a suicidal patient.'13
2. Implementing Treatment
In the implementation of a treatment plan, patient care decisions
are routinely discussed with stakeholders, such as consultants and hos-
pital staff, the patient's support network (family and friends), and the
patient. The implementation of a treatment plan is based on "relative
risk"-a statistical term traditionally used by epidemiologists to deter-
mine the degree to which an individual is at risk to express a particular
disorder or dysfunction relative to another person.' 1 4 In the context
of suicidal patients, relative risk is the end product of evaluating fac-
tors such as prior history of suicidal behavior, the presence or absence
of a major psychiatric disorder, positive or negative response to
psychotropic medication, the degree of social support and therapeutic
alliance established with primary health care providers, and level of
behavioral interaction observed on the unit. 11 Clinicians evaluate the
risk factors of a patient throughout the treatment process. 116
3. Monitoring
Through hospital staff and other stakeholders, clinicians monitor
patients' behaviors to determine if the risk of suicide has subsided or
stabilized enough to decrease restrictions or issue a release. In the last
step of the monitoring process, the hospital communicates that it
trusts the patient enough to manage his own thoughts, feelings, and
affairs.1 17 The risk management goal in this setting is to effectuate a
long-term and stable therapeutic result: "[r]estoring a patient's sense
of well-being, self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-worth is a critical
element of the therapeutic restoration achieved through an inpatient
hospitalization." 118
112. Silverman, supra note 99, at 88-89.
113. See id. at 90 ("The care of a suicidal patient entails a constant review of the risk-benefit
ratio associated with making clinical and administrative interventions.").
114. See id. at 93 (discussing relative risk in the context of risk management of suicidal
patients).
115. See id. at 94.
116. See Packman & Harris, supra note 109, at 166 ("[Sluicide potential [should] be evaluated
several times during treatment, including at the time of hospital admission, at the time of trans-
fer to less restrictive wards, before home visits, and before discharge.").
117. See Silverman, supra note 99, at 99-100.
118. Id. at 99.
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IV. MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
This Part focuses on what mental health courts are, how these
courts function, and how judges perform their roles differently from
traditional criminal court judges. Specifically, this Part demonstrates
how mental health court judges facilitate and lead a collaborative,
team-oriented approach unique to each defendant, focusing on identi-
fying and assessing the defendant's risk, implementing a treatment
plan, and monitoring the defendant's behavior.
A. What are Mental Health Courts?
Mental health courts are specialized, diversionary, and inter-
ventionist courts within the criminal justice system that seek to link
mentally ill defendants with long-term treatment as an alternative to
incarceration. These problem-solving courts address the underlying
problems that often result in the incarceration of mentally ill offend-
ers. 119 In addition to diverting criminal offenders from the normal
criminal process, these courts attempt to improve "legitimate
community participation of persons with mental illness who are
brought before a criminal court through treatment, supervision,
and social services. '120 This preventive model shifts focus from
evaluating blameworthiness to changing the future behavior of de-
fendants in order to avoid recidivism. 121 Mental health courts try to
119. Judge Judith Kaye, a leading advocate of problem-solving courts, pointed out these
courts' goals in succinct fashion:
Their motivating vision is to recognize that crime is often a cycle, and their long-term
goal is to end that cycle. Their primary method is to provide treatment and incentives
for defendants to turn their lives around. These courts closely monitor defendants to
assure compliance with court orders and treatment plans, and link defendants to
outside resources-social services, health services, job training, and housing-that help
offenders reclaim their future, thus potentially saving thousands of lives, and millions of
dollars for state and local governments.
Judith S. Kaye, Albany Law Review Symposium: Refinement or Reinvention, The State of Re-
form in New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831, 837-38 (2006).
120. Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts:
Challenges and Recommendations, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 539, 541 (2005).
121. The following succinctly highlights the unique design of the mental health court:
From a design perspective, the primary goal of mental health courts is to encourage
treatment instead of incarceration when mental illness is expected to motivate criminal
behavior. Shifting the focus of the courts from its traditional legal emphasis to issues of
therapy follows the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence. Mental health courts,
accordingly, change the nature of court proceedings by focusing on treatment and fu-
ture improvements in a person's mental health and general quality of life rather than
on the criminal charge and assessing the level of culpability and punishment. The guid-
ing premise of mental health courts flows from the assumed connection between
mental illness and criminal behavior.
Id. at 553, 555.
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treat the mental illness that may have contributed to the criminal
act.122
Some mental health courts only accept offenders diagnosed as hav-
ing serious and persistent mental illness (SPMI, Axis I disorders),
while other courts only require evidence of mental health problems,
rather than a formal diagnosis. 123 Moreover, in addition to misde-
meanors, some mental health courts now accept defendants charged
with low-level felonies.12 4 Participation in the mental health court sys-
tem is voluntary. 12 5 Eligibility determinations are ultimately made by
the judge after team members-prosecutor, defense attorney, and
mental health and behavior treatment specialists-give feedback and
evaluate whether the offender is a proper candidate for the pro-
122. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 2, at 144-48. Persons with mental illness are more likely
to be arrested, not because they necessarily commit more crimes, but because they are a likely
target of profiling by the police. Although such targeting by law enforcement is unjustified, the
ramifications of such profiling are beyond the scope of this Article. However, given that men-
tally ill people are more likely to be swooped into the criminal justice system, at least mental
health courts offer an opportunity to divert offenders from the traditional criminal justice pro-
cess and try to address their illness. Consider one judge's assessment of the issue:
There's a population of the mentally ill that never commit criminal offenses. That's not
the population we deal with. We're dealing specifically with the population of the men-
tally ill that have gotten involved with the criminal justice system because they have
committed a crime. Before the advent of mental health courts, that group would have
simply gone to jail or state prison, and then come back again because we furnished
them no treatment or chance of success. What a mental health court does is actually
decriminalize the mentally ill by setting up probation terms and mental health treat-
ment, including medication compliance, that will help them succeed in being on proba-
tion and not picking up a new criminal offense and then getting out of the system. So,
in fact, we have decriminalized the population.
Interview with Judge Becky Dugan, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health Courts, Ctr. for Court
Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/collab/documents/
transcript.pdf. Regardless of whether the mentally ill are profiled, scholars note that offenders
with a mental illness frequently "commit violent crimes after release. Of repeat offenders, 53%
of state inmates with a mental illness had a current or past sentence for a violent crime, com-
pared to 45% of those inmates without a mental illness. The comparison among state jailed
inmates is 46% to 32%, and among federal prisoners, it is 44% to 22%." Kosak, supra note 35,
at 398-99; see also Ditton, supra note 3, at 5.
123. See Redlich, supra note 3, at 607 (noting the variety of approaches mental health courts
take regarding the type of mental illness or problem permitted to qualify); see generally Emerg-
ing Judicial Strategies, supra note 23 (describing four different mental health courts' approaches
toward what qualifies as a mental illness).
124. See Redlich, supra note 3, at 607.
125. There is great debate regarding whether one facing a conviction or who needs to plead
guilty in order to be a part of the program is engaging in a "voluntary" decision. See Stefan &
Winick, supra note 11, at 520-23. Although this is an important issue, it is beyond the scope of
this Article. The author does point out that the alternative to entering the mental health court is
to enter the normal criminal process, where the mentally ill are likely to remain untreated or
undiagnosed.
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gram.1 26 Generally, participants enter the program three different
ways: (1) under an agreement, whereby the prosecution agrees to de-
fer prosecuting the case pending treatment (prejudgment plea); (2) a
plea agreement is reached, but disposition or sentencing is deferred
pending treatment; or (3) a plea occurs, and the mental health court
treatment is a condition of probation. 127
Bruce Winick, one of the leading advocates of therapeutic interven-
tions in specialty courts, described the holistic approach taken by
mental health courts as follows:
All mental health courts represent a multiagency and systemwide
response to the problem of untreated mental illness. The process is
designed to motivate the individual to accept needed mental health
treatment and to encourage and monitor treatment compliance.
The judge and the members of the treatment team often play a so-
cial work function in linking the individual to treatment resources
and facilitating their utilization and the individual's ongoing
participation. 128
In its ideal form, a mental health court is driven and coordinated by
community resources, mental health services, public sentiment, and a
criminal court system all working together. 129 These independent and
interdependent factors all play a role in the court's growth and
development. 30
Although mental health courts are a recent development, distinc-
tions are emerging between first (1998-2003) and second (2003-pre-
sent) generation courts.1 31 In particular, mental health courts have
changed in four ways: (1) they are increasingly willing to accept fel-
ony cases in addition to misdemeanor cases (and sometimes violent
felony cases as well); (2) the point of entry into mental health courts is
increasingly post-plea as opposed to pre-plea; (3) courts increasingly
126. See Lisa Shoaf, A Case Study of the Akron Mental Health Court, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 975,
976-86 (2004): Wolff & Pogorzelski, supra note 120. at 541-42; Emerging Judicial Strategies,
supra note 23, at 15-60.
127. Redlich, supra note 3, at 607-08. Under the last scenario, the jail sentence is often sus-
pended pending successful completion of the treatment program. ld.: see also Emerging Judicial
Strategies, supra note 23.
128. Stefan & Winick, supra note 11, at 52.
129. Wolff & Pogorzelski, supra note 120, at 541-42 (noting the multiagency and systemwide
approach to mental health courts).
130. See id. at 542.
131. See Allison D. Redlich et al., The Second Generation of Mental Health Courts, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 527 (2005) (conducting an evaluation of first and second generation
mental health courts based on available empirical data).
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use imprisonment as a sanction; and (4) community health personnel
increasingly oversee adjudication. 132
B. The Role of the Judge
1. The Judge's First Task: Identifying and Assessing Risk
Mental health courts attempt to improve psychiatric stability and
public safety by decreasing the risk that a mentally ill defendant will
commit a crime or harm himself.1 33 With the help of the treatment
team, the judge first assesses whether the offender qualifies for the
program (that is, the individual has a mental illness for which treat-
ment is appropriate) and whether the person presents a high risk of
harm to himself or others if released into the community.
Courts use two traditional models that assess the risk of violence or
future dangerousness among suspect populations. In the clinical pre-
diction model, a clinical professional uses his skill and experience to
predict future behavior. 134 The accuracy of clinical prediction has
been called into question in recent years. John Monahan, one of the
leading advocates for actuarial assessments of future dangerousness,
reviewed the literature on clinical predictions of future dangerousness
in civil commitment proceedings and concluded that clinicians were
accurate only one out of three times. 35 Some of the main criticisms of
132. Id. at 535. Jail is increasingly used as a "wake up call" for medical detoxification, for
repeated criminal offenses, and for repeated noncompliance.
133. "My job is to balance their needs against public safety and if they're not doing what
they're supposed to be doing or if there's the possibility of jeopardizing the public safety, then I
have no choice but to act." Interview with Judge Matthew J. D'Emic, Brooklyn Mental Health
Court, Ctr. for Court Innovation (June 2004), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=Document.viewDocument&documentlD=554&documentTopiclD=25&docu-
mentTypelD=8. Fears concerning mentally ill people are driven by perceived and actual con-
cerns about mentally ill offenders. Media accounts and entertainment industry portrayals of
mentally ill offenders as violent and dangerous have fueled perceived fears about mentally ill
people. However, the leading research on violence and mental illness, sponsored by the MacAr-
thur Foundation, indicated that, "in the absence of drug or alcohol abuse, people discharged
from psychiatric hospitals are no more likely to be violent than those without mental illness."
Fisler, supra note 48, at 588.
134. See Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69
UMKC L. REV. 33, 47-49 (2000) (describing the clinical prediction model).
135. JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1978) (not-
ing these findings); but see Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate
About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 788-90 (1994) (reanalyzing over
fifty data sets and demonstrating that clinical predictions generally exceeded chance, but errors
are inevitable and past behavior is the best prediction of future violent conduct.). It appears
Monahan himself softened his position on clinical prediction. Cf John Monahan, The Prediction
of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM J. PSYCHIATRY
10, 11 (1984) (indicating that, based on new research that used more sophisticated methodology,
predictions of dangerousness made by mental health professionals are accurate closer to 50% of
the time); see also Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
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risk assessment by clinical prediction models are that they are subjec-
tive, "dichotomous-the individual is determined to be either danger-
ous or not-and static-involving a onetime prediction based upon
factors existing at the time the prediction is made." 136
Assessment using an actuarial model is an increasingly prevalent
alternate approach in decisions regarding parole release, prison cus-
tody, and sexually violent predators. 137 Relying less on clinical predic-
tions and intuitive judgments, actuarial models identify risk factors
and weigh them accordingly. Judges use empirically-derived criteria
based upon research regarding the degree to which potential risk fac-
tors correlate with future violence. 138 Scholars often criticize violence
prediction instruments as inflexible and "not . . . sufficiently reliable
and accurate to justify ... deprivations of liberty, at least without ad-
ditional and more individualized evidence concerning the person."' 39
In between these two models is a series of hybrid approaches that
attempt to combine actuarial and clinical prediction.140
Mental health courts have a unique, clinically-based risk manage-
ment model that is routinely updated and altered and relies on dy-
namic assessment.t 41 Given the highly individualized nature of mental
illness, many mental health courts favor a type of clinical model that
has multiple checks as opposed to heavy reliance on actuarial factors.
Typically, the treatment team conducts a psychiatric evaluation and
psychosocial assessment of each offender. 142 Both the social worker
and psychiatrist evaluate the offender and provide a comprehensive
report to the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney. These reports
consist of the offender's social and psychiatric history, family, commu-
121, 144-45 (2005) ("[Monahan] also noted that any estimates of predictive accuracy are likely to
be skewed downward by the fact that the research on which they are based almost always uses
samples of people who are immediately institutionalized after a positive prediction, thus making
impossible observation of their actions had they been left alone, which is the true test of the
prediction.").
136. See Winick, supra note 134, at 47.
137. Id. For further discussion, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997).
138. See Winick, supra note 134, at 47-49.
139. Id. at 50 n.87. For a critical evaluation of actuarial approaches, see GARY B. MELTON ET
AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 284-93 (2d ed. 1998).
140. For a review of the hybrid approaches, see Winick, supra note 134, at 50-52.
141. "The interactive procedures of dynamic risk management, court review, supervision and
coordination of resources all fit together in new court review processes which [sic] utilizes the
judge in a new way to achieve favorable outcomes and meet the expectations of the community
for their judicial system." JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 122 (quoting
mental health court Judge Randal Fritzler).
142. See Fisler, supra note 48, at 594-95 (describing in detail the assessment process for
Brooklyn's Mental Health Court).
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nity ties, treatment needs, and an assessment of the risk of future vio-
lence. Many treatment teams are also trained in "violence risk
assessment schemes," which rely on actuarial factors. 143 Although re-
search indicates that actuarial methods are superior to clinical meth-
ods in predicting violence,'144 many treatment teams do not rely upon
actuarial assessment models because of the "numerous and complex
mechanisms in place for managing risks" and because, until recently,
only misdemeanor offenders were eligible for mental health courts. 145
Unlike many traditional clinical prediction models, mental health
courts routinely alter their treatment plans based on close monitoring
and reevaluation of the offender's progress. It is not a one-time as-
sessment by the judge.146 As one judge noted, "[e]ach defendant has
an individual criminal history but also an individual diagnostic profile
and a different set of needs, and [the judge has] to be ethical in match-
ing up a person's exposure in a criminal case and the price of that
particular criminal action. 1 47 Thus, unlike traditional clinical models,
this "dynamic, interactive scheme" allows judges to continually moni-
tor and guide individuals through therapeutic rehabilitation.1 48 Regu-
larly scheduled review allows mental health courts to monitor the
dynamic process and make changes "to a person's treatment, supervi-
sion and restrictions based upon dynamic factors that reflect increas-
ing [or decreasing] dangerousness. 1' 49
2. The Judge's Second Task: Implementing a Treatment Plan
Risk managers typically move from risk identification and assess-
ment to risk evaluation with the goal of implementing a plan.150 In
143. Id. at 595 n.4.
144. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145. Id. Fisler noted that the complex mechanisms include close monitoring and a coordi-
nated approach of the team members, including not just a psychiatrist, but a behavioral special-
ist, case manager, and others all working to intervene in a multi-systemic manner, not only to
improve the individual's mental health, but also his overall life conditions. See id. at 595-96.
146. See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 122; see also Fisler, supra note 48,
at 595 n.4. Fisler noted that mental health courts de-emphasize actuarial assessment tools be-
cause of likely delay and because "any potential decrease in the court's ability to predict violence
would be more than compensated for by the numerous and complex mechanisms in place" such
as comprehensive coordination, planning, collaboration, flexible alteration of treatment, and
monitoring "for managing risks presented by individual offenders." Id.
147. Interview with Judge Stephanie Rhoades, Anchorage Mental Health Court, Ctr. for
Court Innovation (May 2006), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=Document.viewDocument&documentlD=722&documentTopiclD=25&documentTypelD=8
[hereinafter Rhoades Interview].
148. See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 122 (interview with mental
health court Judge Randal B. Fritzler noting the dynamic interactive scheme).
149. Id.
150. See supra Part III.
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the mental health court context, the judge's task, with the assistance of
the treatment team, is to establish a highly individualized treatment
plan for the offender. 15 1 The treatment plan maintains the following
risk-benefit assessment goals at all times: (1) healing and achieving
psychiatric stability; (2) reducing the likelihood of recidivism; and (3)
protecting public safety. 152 The treatment plans are individualized
and comprehensive: "[e]ach plan identifies mental health treatment,
substance abuse treatment, case management, education, and employ-
ment services that address the offender's specific clinical needs as well
as the public safety requirements articulated by the judge.' 53
Going from risk identification to treatment implementation in an
effective manner is essential. According to one mental health court
judge:
If you don't have treatments to divert people to, then you really
can't operate a successful program. A mental health court is in and
of itself a therapeutic intervention but it's only one component of
what needs to be an overall multidisciplinary approach, and if you
have treatment that's inappropriate or not a good match, then it's
set up for the person to fail. 154
Judges often develop individualized treatment plans early in the court
process. These plans require offenders to take their medication and
attend therapy. 155 Other requirements center on normalizing defend-
ants' daily behaviors and routines. Treatment plans include require-
ments such as "desisting criminal behaviors, attending scheduled court
review hearings, meeting with vocational training officers, finding and
maintaining employment, and following more idiosyncratic mandates
(for example, physical exercise, keeping one's home clean, or moving
from a certain location)."' 56
Mental health courts use a collaborative, nonadversarial team com-
prised of the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and mental and be-
havioral health specialists to establish direct links to the mental health
151. "It requires that the treatment team adequately first assess and then fully accept the
client's potential capacity so that we don't form expectations that exceed the person's capacity
when they're maximally functioning." Interview with Dr. Keram, Satellite Broadcast of Mental
Health Courts, Ctr. for Court Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.
gov/programs/collab/documents/transcript.pdf [hereinafter Keram Interview].
152. See Fisler, supra note 48, at 595 ("Each treatment plan is designed to maximize the likeli-
hood that a particular offender will be engaged in treatment, achieve psychiatric stability, and
avoid crime.").
153. Id. at 595.
154. Rhoades Interview, supra note 147.
155. Id. Offenders sometimes enter into behavioral contracts with the court.
156. Redlich, supra note 3, at 607.
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system.15 7 The judge and the treatment team are often trained and
have experience working with mentally ill individuals. 158 In particu-
lar, community and health agencies linked to courts provide pathways
to assist offenders by offering such services as day treatment pro-
grams, individual therapy, intensive psychiatric rehabilitation pro-
grams, psychosocial clubs, and assertive community treatment
teams.1 59 The judge attempts to address the underlying problems
leading to criminal acts and structure plans that can improve offend-
ers' social conditions:
The treatment plan really rests on two foundations that have to be
solid. One is having an accurate diagnostic assessment, because if
you don't get. the problem right, you're not going to get the treat-
ment plan right.... The second foundation is that the person who's
doing your assessment and the team that's doing the treating have
experience to deal with the problem that's been identified .... Once
you have a sense of what his diagnosis is or the diagnoses are, a
treatment plan is going to involve lots and lots of different pieces.
You need to treat the entire environment that this person lives in,
making sure that they have a roof over their head in which they're
not likely to become noncompliant.160
Because studies show that the risk of violence by people suffering
from co-occurring disorders (for example, drug or alcohol abuse and
mental illness) is dramatically higher, specialists attempt to treat both
disorders concurrently.1 61
3. The Judge's Third Task: Monitoring the Risk
The judge's final task is to mandate and monitor community mental
health treatment. 162 The intensity of monitoring often depends on the
157. Shoaf, supra note 126, at 976-86; Redlich, supra note 3, at 607-08; Wolff & Pogorzelski,
supra note 120, at 541-42.
158. The team is expected to be trained in "basic mental disorders, medications and side ef-
fects, what a psychiatric assessment is, what a neuro-psychiatric assessment is, what kind of treat-
ment is available in your community, why individuals with one diagnosis get hooked up with one
place and individuals with another diagnosis get hooked up with another place, and what the
funding mechanisms are for these things." Rhoades Interview, supra note 147.
159. Fisler, supra note 48, at 596-97 (noting the variety of treatment alternatives and the fact
that mental health courts often communicate with the treatment provider weekly and receive
written reports monthly).
160. Keram Interview, supra note 151, at 6.
161. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpa-
tient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
393-401 (noting that offenders suffering from co-occurring disorders are more likely to engage
in violent behavior); Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 16.
162. Redlich, supra note 3, at 607-08 ("[A]II MHCs mandate and monitor community mental
health treatment.").
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defendant's condition.1 63 The goal is to ensure that defendants stay
involved in community treatment by attending therapy sessions, tak-
ing medications, and following treatment plans. Thus, monitoring is
always done with the goal of controlling risk. One mental health
judge described the process as follows:
The judge has to be on top of it. You have to see these people every
week, and make sure that nothing bad happens. Someone from the
court has to be in touch with their programs-to make sure that
they're there, that they're doing what they're supposed to be doing,
that they're taking their medications. Again, public safety is a huge
part of this. The mental health court is labor-intensive, and the fo-
cus is to keep people in treatment and out of jail. These are people
who are out in the community and you have to make sure that eve-
rybody's safe. It just takes time and effort. 164
Treatment specialists, court monitors, and specialized probation of-
ficers work with treatment providers and keep judges informed. 65
Under this model of therapeutic jurisprudence, judges recognize small
and large successes and often engage in a carrot-and-stick approach
that involves public praise and shaming where appropriate. 166 The va-
riety of responses include "[p]raise, certificates, admonitions, in-
creased or decreased frequency of court appearances, and imposition
or lifting of restrictions on activities.' ' 167 More importantly, through
frequent interaction, judges develop relationships with offenders.
Consequently, judges' disappointment or anger can be powerful moti-
vating forces. 168 Through continued interaction, judges are able to
foster therapeutic alliances built on trust and mutual respect.1 69
Judges hold hearings weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, or even quarterly
and typically include all team members.170 To the extent offenders
maintain stability, they can graduate from mental health courts. At
that point, the charges are usually either dropped (pre-plea), or the
163. See id. at 607.
164. Interview with Judge Matthew J. D'Emic, Brooklyn Mental Health Court, Ctr. for Court
Innovation (June 2004), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Doc-
ument.viewDocument&document=554&documentTopicID=25&documentTypelD=8.
165. Id.
166. The rewards and sanctions administered often vary from court to court. Examples of
sanctions include the following: (1) increased frequency of hearings; (2) reprimands and admon-
ishments: (3) threatened jail time; (4) actual jail time; or (5) termination from the program.
Shoaf, supra note 126, at 976-86. Some rewards include praise from the judge and team mem-
bers in court, changes in treatment requirements, and tangible gifts, such as gift certificates. Id.
167. Fisler, supra note 48, at 597.
168. Id.
169. See Winick, supra note 134, at 57-60 (describing the therapeutic impact judges can have
on domestic violence offenders when mutual trust is built).
170. Redlich, supra note 3, at 608.
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convictions are vacated or expunged (post-plea). 17' If an offender
does not comply, he may be dismissed from the mental health court
and returned to regular criminal court.1 72 Given the instability of
many participants, "nonadherence is common and expected."'173 As a
result, mental health court judges must be patient, willing to issue
graduated sanctions, and able to remain realistic in setting measurable
and attainable goals.174
V. MENTAL HEALTH COURT JUDGES As DYNAMIC
RISK MANAGERS
Although not typically recognized as a judiciary function, risk man-
agement constitutes a fundamental method by which mental health
court judges dynamically solve problems. Judge Randal B. Fritzler
aptly encapsulated the phenomenon in one sentence: "The basic func-
tions involved in dynamic risk management are not new to the court
system but the application and focus [in mental health courts] is revo-
lutionary.' 1 75 Mental health court judges do not merely process cases
or act as neutral arbiters. Mental health court judges manage risk.
This Part explains why mental health court judges are dynamic risk
managers, paying careful attention to how these judges understand
and conceive of their own role and how mental health court judges'
approaches parallel the traditional risk management approaches high-
lighted in Part 111.176
A. Mental Health Court Judges: Dynamic Risk Managers
In partnership with mental health court teams, judges perform three
tasks: (1) conduct risk assessments in which they evaluate defendants'
potential harm to themselves or the public, (2) evaluate and imple-
ment treatment plans designed to minimize defendants' risk and heal
them, and (3) monitor risks over a period of time, often requiring fre-
quent return visits. One judge summarized the process as follows:
"You've got to have very good assessments, treatment placements,
and monitoring done by both mental health and drug and alcohol spe-
171. Id.; see also Patricia A. Griffin et al., The Use of Criminal Charges and Sanctions in
Mental Health Courts, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1285 (2002).
172. Redlich, supra note 3, at 608.
173. Id.
174. Id. ("[Ijt should be noted that perfect performance is not expected in [mental health
courts]. As such, a hierarchy of sanctions is in place with jail usually as a later option when other
penalties have failed. Thus, although most [mental health courts] have lenient policies regarding
noncompliance, all courts have mechanisms in place to counter nonadherence to mandates.").
175. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 121 (interview with Randal Fritzler).
176. See supra notes 73-118 and accompanying text.
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cialists .... That's where the judge can be an agent of change." 177
Judges facilitate a flexible, collaborative, and team-oriented approach
in order to tailor the intervention and treatment of defendants toward
healing them and ending the revolving door phenomenon. Although
mental health court judges occasionally rely on actuarial tools, partic-
ularly regarding the potential for violence, most make clinical judg-
ments based on the opinions of expert team members. Unlike the
traditional clinical model, judges behave dynamically by continually
interacting with offenders and altering treatment plans to effectuate
positive outcomes.
Mental health court judges' approaches are similar to that of risk
managers. For example, risk managers view risk factors in context,
rather than as isolated events and, therefore, try to effectuate a sys-
tematic change to protect and lower an institution's risk. 178 Risk man-
agers conduct individualized interventions based on the need to deal
with specific risk factors.' 7 9 Risk managers constantly monitor risks
until they are low enough that such regulation is unnecessary. 180 By
engaging in a flexible, dynamic approach, risk managers constantly re-
calibrate risk and modify their plans.181 Finally, a successful risk man-
agement program often reduces costs to the company or entity.182
Similarly, mental health court judges apply a prevention model that
treats the crime and, more importantly, the mental illness in context
and not as an isolated event or the result of individuals' irresponsible
actions. 83 Mental health court judges apply a highly individualized
clinical assessment that constantly evaluates risk factors and the of-
fenders' conditions.18 4 They monitor offenders through the treatment
team and repeated appearances in court until graduation is appropri-
ate. 8 5 Additionally, as successful risk management programs are
more economical for corporate entities, graduation from mental
177. Interview with Judge Stephen Manley, Mental Health Treatment Court, Santa Clara
County, Ctr. for Court Innovation (Jan. 2005), available at http://courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Document.viewDocument&documentlD=618&documentTopiclD=25&document
TypeID=8.
178. See supra Part III.A-D.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra Part IV.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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health courts saves the state money in the long-term when compared
to the cost of cycling offenders through jails or prisons. 86
B. Mental Health Court Judges Possess Risk Management Qualities
When properly employing the therapeutic and problem-solving ap-
proach, mental health court judges possess the same qualities as suc-
cessful risk managers: understanding, practical abilities and
communication skills.187 The judge's role in the mental health court is
particularly illuminating, because the judge takes on many non-tradi-
tional duties. Consider one commentator's evaluation of the mental
health court in Akron, Ohio:
The judge is viewed by most of the mental health court team as the
single most important character in the mental health court. Team
members and other municipal court judges interviewed expressed
that while the judge's position of authority certainly impacts what
gets accomplished by the court, it is the judge's philosophy of thera-
peutic jurisprudence combined with her outgoing personality that
truly makes the court a success. An effective mental health court
judge was described as one who needs to be able to look beyond the
crime at the underlying issues, and who has to believe in the program
and to have a willingness to learn, the capacity to be stern, yet com-
passionate, and the desire to do the job for little in return, other than
personal satisfaction. The role of the judge is different from the
traditional, 'adversarial' figure common to most courtrooms. The
judge's role is to determine, with the help of the treatment team,
who is eligible for the program, and to oversee involvement in the
program by requiring the client to appear in court on a frequent
basis. While the judge does deliver sanctions (which vary in inten-
sity depending on the infraction committed) for noncompliant be-
havior while a person is in the program, she also delivers rewards
for good behavior and for successful completion of phases in the
program. 188
Mental health court judges must also exude the qualities of successful
risk managers-an "open mind," a willingness to get "to the heart of
186. Interview with Judge Stephen Manley, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health Courts, Ctr.
for Court Innovation, at 4-5 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
collab/documents/transcript.pdf ("By keeping these clients out of jail, by cutting down on the
recidivism rate, by producing clients that are taking their medications and are staying in treat-
ment, you are saving and avoiding cost to the county."); Slobogin, supra note 135, at 156 (noting
that drug courts and other multi-systemic therapy models are far cheaper than putting individu-
als in jail or prison); see M. Susan Ridgely et al., Justice, Treatment and Cost: An Evaluation of
the Fiscal Impact of Allegheny County Mental Health Court (2007), available at http://www.rand.
org/pubs/technical-reports/TR439/ (recent RAND study indicating that mental health courts
have the potential to save taxpayers money).
187. See supra Part III.C.
188. Shoat, supra note 120, at 980-81 (emphasis added).
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the problem," and "a mixture of firmness and fairness." 18 9 Part III
discussed the importance of these skills for risk managers, but also
emphasized that good risk managers are realistic about the risk-reduc-
tion goals they seek to achieve. 190 Similarly, mental health judges
often begin with small goals for offenders, because they may be
unstable.191
C. The Parallels Between Managing the Risks of Mentally Ill
Criminal Offenders and Suicidal Patients
Mental health courts parallel modern hospital disease manage-
ment. 192 For example, the therapeutic alliances involved in managing
suicidal patients and mentally ill defendants are nearly identical.
There are several correlations between mental health court judges and
psychiatrists. Doctors' goals are to address patients' needs and de-
189. See supra Part III.C.
190. Id.
191. Mental Health Court Judge Patrick Morris noted that expectations for mentally ill pa-
tients are lower than drug offenders:
Well, for those of you who have drug court experience, throw away the charts. This is a
new and different population. and the definition must be broadened substantially. In
drug court, we require employment. We require schooling. We require drug-free liv-
ing. We require NAs. We require a sponsor. In mental health court, we start with
medication compliance. The first thing out of the box is, they've got to be seeing their
doctor regularly and taking their meds, and they will, of course, be free from street
drugs and alcohol.
But the other definitions of success that we've used in drug court do not necessarily
apply here. A substantial number of these folks are so low functioning that you have to
reduce your level of expectations. Many are illiterate, and when you say, 'Go to
school,' you may mean simply 'Go [to] the county library and be engaged in a literacy
program.' What you want to do is essentially find a way to occupy them constructively
in the community. Re-engage them with their family if at all possible, or a semblance of
family, so that they have a support group out there and a daily activity to go to that's
meaningful and constructive. And it may be as simple as a volunteer position at a
homeless shelter; it may be at a school; but you look for a variety of ways to simply help
them reconstruct a life that has some meaning to it, and that's about all you can do with
some of these clients.
Interview with Judge Patrick Morris, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health Courts, Ctr. for Court
Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/collab/documents/
transcript.pdf.
192. This argument is not unique to mental health courts. Bruce Winick similarly argued that
a domestic violence court is similar to a risk manager that applies case management and risk
management approaches in order to reduce the risk of violence. Winick, supra note 134, at 57.
Winick noted that such an approach parallels a "modern hospital practicing disease management
and other forms of case management to teach patients how to manage their own illnesses, to
encourage preventive approaches by patients, to increase the likelihood that patients receive
appropriate medical interventions, and to decrease the risk of medical malpractice." Id. at 57.
See also Shirley A. Musich et al., Costs and Benefits of Prevention and Disease Management, 5
DISEASE MANAGEMENT HEALTH OUTCOMES 153 (Mar. 1999) (noting how case management has
grown to be a tool to measure and alter outcomes for patients and prevent illness).
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crease the risk that patients will harm themselves. 193 Mental health
court judges attempt to address underlying social problems, while de-
creasing the risk of harm to offenders and the public. Similar to doc-
tors, mental health judges prioritize effective responses and "restor[e]
a patient's sense of well-being, self-esteem, self-confidence," and abil-
ity to live safely in the community.1 94 Judges, much like clinicians,
foster therapeutic alliances with offenders by building relationships
with them.195 Psychiatrists' assessments are performed by examining
and interviewing offenders, using the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association, and
consulting with the rest of the clinical team. 196 Similarly, judges,
through treatment teams, rely on psychological assessments, but also
continue to review new information concerning offenders while ad-
justing assessments. 197 Unlike models that predict dangerousness by
assessing the probability of an event reoccurring, the mental health
court approach attempts to reduce, manage, and reallocate risky be-
havior.198 Psychiatrists also attempt to reduce the risk that a person
will commit suicide. Similar to psychiatrists, judges collaborate with
stakeholders and team members to develop treatment plans. The
treatment of suicidal patients involves the collaboration and coordina-
tion of the clinician, hospital staff, and hospital administration. 99 Fi-
nally, both doctors and judges monitor participants directly, but also
rely upon team members to monitor the participants' progress. Thus,
193. See supra Part III.D.
194. Id.
195. Id. "[J]udges foster therapeutic alliances with defendants by using the same tech-
niques-empathy, acceptance, warmth, and allowance of self-expression-that therapists use
with their clients." Fisler, supra note 48, at 597.
196. See supra Part III.D. Risk management in this context involves a cooperative, dynamic,
and flexible process of continual risk assessment and treatment:
Clinical risk management and clinical judgment are based on current clinical data, past
data, experience, basic knowledge, a working relationship with the patient, an aware-
ness of the milieu in which the therapy is being conducted, the physical environment of
the inpatient unit, the evolving psychiatric disorder that has contributed to the patient's
suicidal state, the degree of social and familial support available to the patient, the
psychological/cognitive level of the patient, and the behavioral assessment of the pa-
tient. All of these data must be understood in terms of an evolving system that is
undergoing change due to the therapeutic process, the effects of medication, and the
benefits of being in a therapeutic inpatient milieu.
Silverman, supra note 99, at 102.
197. Although judges do not have a tool as sophisticated as the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders at their disposal, they rely on mental health treatment specialists'
assessments.
198. See R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 50, 58-60 (1998) (distinguishing static and dynamic factors and their
importance in predicting recidivism and the effectiveness of treatment interventions).
199. See supra Part III.D.
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therapeutic goals blend well with the risk management approaches
that mental health court judges use.
VI. How DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT AFFECTS THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
This Part addresses how the idea of judges as dynamic risk manag-
ers fits within scholars' understanding of the current criminal process
and the role of judges within that process.200 Specifically, this Part
argues that mental health court judges are morphing into a hybrid so-
cial worker and probation officer.201 Moreover, this Part asserts that,
when functioning in its ideal form, mental health courts fall outside
the "new penology," which focuses on managing dangerous categories
of people, because the focus in these courts is on individuals, not
groups.20 2 Thus, to the extent that mental health court judges focus
on individualized assessment and treatment, there is potential for the
criminal process to focus more on therapeutic healing and less on
punishment.
A. The Dynamic Risk Managing Judge: Half Social Worker, Half
Probation Officer
The risk management tools employed by judges transform their role
into a hybrid between a social worker and probation officer. Mental
health court judges act as chief administrators for social service net-
works with authority to make initial assessments and implement treat-
ment plans. Judges also monitor offenders and offer rewards and
sanctions.
1. The Social Worker Role
As dynamic risk managers who take on a social worker role, mental
health court judges are able to institute a multi-systemic approach in
an effort to heal offenders. Researchers have confirmed that this
model is more successful than a punitive approach:
In general, researchers have found that programs based on fear,
punishment, or psychotherapy-the bread and butter of older reha-
bilitation programs-are much less likely to reduce recidivism than
programs 'that are highly structured and behavioral or cognitive-
behavioral, that are run in the community rather than an institution,
that are run with integrity and enthusiasm, that target higher-risk
rather than lower-risk offenders, and that are intensive in terms of
200. See infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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number of hours and overall length of program.' For instance, 'mul-
tisystemic therapy,' which involves intense family, school, and peer-
based interventions over a four-month period, can reduce recidi-
vism among violent juveniles by as much as 75% compared to
matched control groups that receive no treatment or traditional
treatment in prisons. The same type of intensive, ecological treat-
ment works well with many adult offenders. Thus, drug treatment
courts that closely monitor the offender's performance in the pro-
gram, as well as the program itself, typically cut drug use recidivism
in half.
20 3
Mental health court judges take the unique opportunity afforded by
these courts to employ a multi-systemic approach toward problem-
solving.2 04
Similar to the judges who used the Eighth Amendment as a jurisdic-
tional grant of authority to attempt to reform prison conditions across
the United States (especially the plantation prison model in the
south), 20 5 judges are using mental health courts as a jurisdictional
grant of authority to implement therapeutic jurisprudence, because
203. Slobogin, supra note 135, at 151-52; see also Don Andrews, The Psychology of Criminal
Conduct and Effective Treatment, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING 35, 38-41 (James
McGuire ed., 1995) (analyzing criminal justice research and concluding that punitive programs
are less effective in reducing recidivism than treatment programs and that "effective correctional
treatment involves attention to individual differences in risk, need, and responsivity and to the
use of professional discretion"); Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Serious
Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 573 (1995) (recidivism rate three times lower for those participating in
multi-systemic therapy than those participating in traditional individual treatment); Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53
VAND. L. REV. 831, 834, 839 (2000) ("[D]rug courts are able to determine which programs can
effectively monitor the progress of individual clients, and which clients are able to take advan-
tage of capable programs ... [by mandating] that service providers continually inform the court
about the progress (or lack thereof) of each client [and] ... monitoring the treatment providers
themselves."). Mental health courts have not been around long enough to properly evaluate
whether they reduce recidivism. However, drug courts, which follow a similar approach, have
been successful. See Duren Banks & Denise C. Gottfredson, The Effects of Drug Treatment and
Supervision on Time to Rearrest Among Drug Treatment Court Participants, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES
385, 397 (2003) (noting a 40% recidivism rate among drug court offenders and 61% rate among
control groups); Eric Blumenson, Recovering from Drugs and the Drug War: An Achievable
Public Health Alternative, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 225, 235 (2002) (finding that drug treat-
ment programs "reported a dramatic decrease in criminal activity among participants").
204. See GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE 35 (2004) (noting that problem-solving courts allow judges, prosecutors and
public defenders to redefine their goals while simultaneously managing the risks of public safety
and protecting a defendant's rights).
205. In MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998), Feeley and Rubin
chronicle the judiciary's attempt to reform prison conditions, particularly in southern states. In
particular, the authors show, through case histories from a number of states, how federal judges
used the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual language as a "grant of jurisdiction" in re-
sponse to the lack of reform by federal, state, and local governments. Id. at 171.
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the health care system, community care system, and prison system
have failed to address the revolving door facing mentally ill defend-
ants. Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren of the Broward County Mental
Health Court summarized this view as follows:
We view the Mental Health Court as a 'strategy' to bring fairness to
the administration of justice for persons being arrested on minor
offenses who suffer from major mental disability. We have seen
time and time again true successes. Persons with major psychiatric
disorders and/or mental disabilities can live and thrive in the com-
munity with individualized care, treatment and community
support.
20 6
By serving as active case managers, creative administrators, and com-
munity leaders, mental health courts judges undertake a social worker
role 207 and apply a different value system than that normally found in
the criminal process. 208
2. The Probation Officer Role
Judges are not only acting as social workers, but also as probation
officers charged with monitoring risk and regulating behavior.20 9 In-
stead of delegating the post-plea process to probation officers, judges
use their plenary authority to impose conditions and directly monitor
defendants in accordance with a treatment plan. This alters the crimi-
206. Denckla & Berman, supra note 2, at 17.
207. Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Response to Domestic Violence: The Case for
a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) ("These are admittedly
different from traditional conceptions of the judge's role as remote and passive adjudicator. Dif-
ferent, but not appropriate.").
208. Judge William G. Schma summed up the value alteration that a therapeutic approach
brings to the legal system:
As David Wexler, cofounder with Bruce Winick of the school of TJ [Therapeutic Juris-
prudence] has pointed out, the adversarial nature of our system has legitimate and cru-
cial value for critical thinking. However the legal system suffers for a culture of
adversarial representation and relationships, in which argument rises to the level of a
privileged status. This can obscure many important societal values that the legal system
need not and should not ignore, such as outcome, social harmony and the ethic of care.
TJ is receiving attention precisely because it requires that we recognize such values,
balance them with others and make choices .... Judges must take the lead and assume
responsibility for these issues.
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 91-92 (quoting William G. Schma, Judging
for the New Millennium, 37 CT. REV. 4 (2000)). Rather than simply having criminal offenders
serve time in prison or jail and be released into society without any curative treatment, the
mental health court movement reflects the public value that mentally ill offenders should not
simply be sent into a revolving door and that these risks can and should be managed.
209. See Kaye & Knipps, supra note 207, at 11 ("[M]uch of the discretion that problem solving
judges exercise occurs within a sphere that is unquestionably within the purview of the courts:
how to put the resources that have been allocated to us to their best and more effective use. In
other words, much of this so-called 'policymaking' is nothing more than sound court
administration.").
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nal process, because increased active monitoring from the bench re-
sults in increased accountability by defendants entering diversion
programs, such as mental health courts.210 Judges are not passing of-
fenders to probation officers. As Berman and Feinblatt noted in their
survey of problem-solving courts:
[U]nfortunately, probation departments have, by and large, turned
out to be faulty vehicles-underresourced and overwhelmed with
staggering caseloads, many probation departments have found it
difficult to identify innovative interventions, to develop meaningful
connections with community-based treatment providers, or to make
informed decisions about which offenders require the most inten-
sive supervision. The result has been that treatment sanctions have
tended to lack teeth. Offenders have suffered few consequences un-
less they get arrested again.21'
Judges, often through court psychologists, case managers, or proba-
tion officers, monitor whether defendants obtain treatment and en-
gage in the healing process. Probation officers are now members of
the team who offer feedback to the court, but do not ultimately make
risk management decisions. Moreover, by requiring frequent court
visits, judges are able to directly engage defendants and issue rewards
or sanctions. 212 Consequently, both judges and offenders become
more accountable.
B. Dynamic Risk Management Outside the Actuarial Model of
Crime Management
One of the more influential statements on managing criminal cate-
gories was set forth by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon as an
210. See BERMAN & FEINBLAT-r, supra note 204, at 56 (noting that problem-solving judges
have subsumed the role of the probation officer and that "the resulting burden on judicial re-
sources is not insignificant, but by requiring offenders to return to court regularly to report on
their progress, problem-solving courts have markedly improved compliance"). Because the role
of parole and probation officers has evolved over the past thirty-five years from that of a social
worker to more of a law enforcer that parolees and probationers fear, problem-solving judges
are now the institutional actors who are best positioned to balance the dual roles of social
worker and enforcer, as well as ensuring that the offender remains engaged in the process.
Shauhin A. Talesh, Parole Officers and the Exclusionary Rule: Is There Any Deterrent Left?, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1179 (1999) (describing not only how the role of parole officer has evolved into
that of a law enforcer geared toward compliance and control, but how parolees increasingly fear
their parole officer).
211. BERMAN & FEINBLATr, supra note 204, at 56.
212. For example, "a judge who orders an offender to attend drug treatment in Portland's
conventional court usually has to rely on a probation officer to enforce attendance." Id. at 91.
Furthermore, Berman and Feinblatt noted that "[t]he city's probation officers are so burdened
with enormous caseloads that making contact with a probationer is infrequent at best, and con-
tact with a treatment program is unlikely. Feedback to the sentencing judge almost never hap-
pens." Id. (also finding that "[o]n probation, it could take months or years before the offender
gets picked up for violating a treatment mandate") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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explication of "the new penology. '213 Feeley and Simon argued that,
in the late twentieth century, a new model for managing dangerous
persons emerged that relied heavily on statistical factors and actuarial
methods of risk assessment. 21 4 This new penology focused on manag-
ing the risk of group populations and replaced the old model of indi-
vidual moral culpability, clinical diagnosis, intervention, treatment,
and retributive judgment.21 5 As a result, notions of rehabilitation
were replaced with managing career criminals and minimizing risk.216
In contrast to the correctional continuum of the 1960s and 1970s, "this
new custodial continuum does not design penal measures for the par-
ticular needs of the individual or the community. Rather, it sorts indi-
viduals into groups according to the degree of control warranted by
their risk profiles. ' 21 7 Instead of relying on externally imposed social
goals, such as public safety or inmate reintegration, criminal justice
institutions in the new penology used internal system measures as
evaluative performance indicators. 218 As one commentator noted in
analyzing the new penology, "the optimism of the rehabilitative ideal
that had played such an important role in 18th, 19th, and mid-20th
century penology has been replaced by a pragmatic pessimism about
the possibility of transformation. '21 9
Simon and Feeley's actuarial paradigm accurately reflected a shift in
penal theory and a disturbing trend in criminal justice systems' man-
agement of dangerous populations. Nonetheless, the risk manage-
ment approach employed by mental health court judges largely falls
outside the new penological model. In particular, mental health
courts focus on each individual in an attempt to divert, therapeutically
treat, and reintegrate them, while also minimizing future criminality
and potential harm to others. The risk management approach is ad-
justable, individualized, and does not merely sort dangerous people
into groups in order to incapacitate them. The variety of approaches
judges use are all calibrated to the specific risk presented. Judges try
to make decisions about proper interventions, monitoring, and super-
vision of each individual offender and focus on healing the specific
213. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
214. Feeley & Simon, The New Penology, supra note 21, at 452.
215. Id.
216. Id. "It seeks to regulate levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual devi-
ants or social malformations."
217. Id. at 459.
218. Id.
219. Winick, supra note 134, at 59 n.132 (analyzing Feeley & Simon's new penology model in
the context of domestic violence courts).
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individual. 220 Moreover, the assessment of dangerousness is not heav-
ily dependent upon actuarial models, but instead relies on clinical pre-
dictions that are continuously updated and adjusted based on the
defendant's decreasing or increasing level of risk. 221 When function-
ing properly,222 mental health courts' approaches appear closer to the
old medical model than the punitive model currently in place, because
they focus on healing and intervention as opposed to incapacitation.2 23
To the extent that mental health courts accept more felony cases,
future evaluation and research should be directed toward whether ju-
dicial, clinical prediction models based on collaboration with the treat-
ment team can be assisted by actuarial tools in order to increase
accuracy in the assessment process.224 As outcome data on the suc-
cess of these courts becomes available, scholars will be able to evalu-
ate whether the clinical assessment model needs adjustment.
Regardless, if mental health courts manage human risk, judges
should-like corporate or public government risk managers-be
armed with the best assessment and monitoring tools possible, such
that they can effectuate their goals. Although actuarial instruments
are not perfect, they could be used to assist judges and treatment
teams.225 Given the variety of symptoms among mentally ill offenders
220. See id. (arguing that domestic violence courts fall outside the new penology, because the
focus is on the individual therapy and treatment as opposed to groups and actuarial category
markers resulting in punishment).
221. It remains to be seen whether this trend will change if mental health courts continue to
handle more felony cases.
222. The author recognizes that mental health courts are relatively new and, therefore, there
is a limited amount of qualitative and quantitative data on these courts. If research were to
uncover that risk management approaches by mental health court judges are aimed primarily at
reducing alarming behaviors rather than comprehensive diversion and rehabilitation, then a
credible argument could be made that the new penological paradigm is more applicable than this
Article currently acknowledges.
223. Jonathan Simon has demonstrated how statutory preventive detention approaches for
dealing with sex offenders reflect a shift from a medical model for dealing with sex offenders to a
more direct system of managing risk through incapacitation. Jonathan Simon, Managing the
Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POL'Y & L. 452 (1998).
224. See Fisler, supra note 48, at 594-95 (noting that mental health courts in New York that
admit felony defendants are trained in violence actuarial assessments but do not rely much on
them in practice).
225. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STORY
OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 100-01 (2001) (noting the MacArthur Research Network
research on actuarial risk assessment models and, in particular, the "iterative classification
trees"-one of the more reliable models). The study noted that the tree can identify recidivism
rates of 76% down to groups that have a 1% chance of recidivism. Id. Actuarial models could
be useful during the initial evaluation stage by the treatment team.
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and the need for individualized assessments, actuarial models should
only be used to anchor judicial assessments, not to supplant them. 226
C. The Therapeutic Process is the Healing, Not the Punishment
Recognizing how mental health courts fall outside the new penol-
ogy shows that the criminal process can focus on healing an individual
offender instead of categorizing a group of offenders, and punishing
them. The process in mental health courts is focused on offenders'
best interests rather than protecting formal rights. As one of the first
mental health court judges noted, "[w]e are, for the first time in mem-
ory, not simply processing cases; we're doing the right thing in helping
people solve base issues that bring them into the criminal justice
system. '227
This is a remarkably different approach from the traditional crimi-
nal process, which seeks to preserve protections for defendants "by
fostering an ideal of perfectibility and a preoccupation with proce-
dure. In the process it has created a system so complex and cumber-
some that in the great bulk of minor criminal cases these protections
and procedures serve limited functions at best. ' 228 Because the cost
of invoking one's rights is often greater than the loss of the rights
themselves, the majority of cases are resolved via plea bargaining.229
A judge's sense of justice under the traditional adversarial model is
more compatible with speed and efficiency than with favorable out-
comes. 230 As one judge noted:
226. Moreover, future research should explore the extent to which judges and team members
employ a de facto use of actuarial control based on observed patterns and probabilities of of-
fenders over time. As more studies are released on these courts, scholars will be able to examine
whether judges who obtain more experience with these offenders engage in both an actuarial
and a case-based individualized model. Although this Article compares an ideal-type dichotomy
model (actuarial versus clinical, individualized care), judges in practice may, to varying degrees,
draw on actuarial-like models at some heuristic level.
227. Interview with Judge Patrick Morris, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health Courts, Ctr.
for Court Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/collab/
documents/transcripts.pdf.
228. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 297 (1979) (ethnography of criminal court, which chronicles how the
process of invoking a defendant's rights within the criminal process proves to be greater than the
rights themselves).
229. Id. at 277: see also BERMAN & FEINBLATI, supra note 204, at 19 ("[Plea bargaining]
fundamentally alters the balance of power in the court system, moving crucial decision-making
authority away from judges and jurors and placing it in the hands prosecutors .... The ultimate
decision whether to bring a charge, moreover, or whether to accept a guilty plea ... is left to the
prosecutor's essentially unreviewable choice.").
230. BERMAN & FEINBLATTr, supra note 204, at 19.
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In many of today's cases, the traditional approach yields unsatisfy-
ing results. The addict arrested for drug dealing is adjudicated, does
time, then goes right back to dealing on the street. The battered
wife obtains a protective order, goes home and is beaten again.
Every legal right of the litigants is protected, all procedures fol-
lowed, yet we aren't making a dent in the underlying problem. Not
good for the parties involved. Not good for the community. Not
good for the courts.231
Although mental health courts often relax formal procedures, the sub-
stantive process, when the court is functioning in its ideal form, (that
is, identifying therapeutic opportunities for the client, locating housing
for the client, making frequent court appearances, directing discus-
sions with the judge, and using carrots and sticks) can result in heal-
ing. Thus, this model shifts the analysis from the punishment fitting
the crime and the process ultimately being the punishment, to the pro-
cess fitting the problem. 232 As mental health court Judge Randal Frit-
zler aptly stated, dynamic risk management is "revolutionary. ' 233
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has not advocated for or against mental health courts,
but has recognized and explained how mental health court judges are
dynamic risk managers. Understanding mental health court judges as
dynamic risk managers not only alerts us to ways in which social con-
trol mechanisms are changing, but also offers an alternate model for
how judges process defendants within the criminal justice system. Un-
like traditional criminal courts, mental health courts process defend-
ants using a risk management strategy capable of calibrating responses
to specific events as they evolve over time. 234
Problem-solving courts (including, but not limited to, mental health,
family, drug, domestic violence, juvenile, juvenile mental health,
homeless, and community courts) are emerging across the country as
viable alternatives to the traditional criminal process. Mental health
courts are one example of this new model, by which judges do not
231. John B. Van de North, Jr., Problem-Solving Judges-Meddlers or Innovators?, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 949, 958 (2006) (quoting Judge Judith Kaye).
232. Although procedural rules are relaxed and there is still the coercive threat of jail or
imprisonment if the client repeatedly shows no progress or commits an egregious violation, this
"stick" is much further in the background of the process, often invoked only as a last resort.
233. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19, at 121 (interview with Randal Fritzler).
234. Although this approach offers potential for effectuating change in offenders, it also has
the potential for inequitable outcomes (for example, some individuals may be more likely to be
classified and treated as dangerous than others). This will be a continuing struggle that propo-
nents, opponents, and scholars should cautiously monitor as problem-solving courts grow in
number and type.
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simply adjudicate cases, but tackle underlying social issues that led the
offender to incarceration, while simultaneously diverting the offender
out of traditional criminal court. 235 In addition to exploring how risk
management routines are actually employed in mental health courts
and whether therapeutic results are being realized, future empirical
research should also explore whether this approach can be used to
heal and reintegrate other types of defendants, even those perceived
as dangerous. Thus, understanding judges as dynamic risk managers
provides a framework for visualizing a new image of not only their
role, but also a criminal process that focuses on therapeutic healing
instead of punishment.
235. To the extent problem-solving courts are here to stay, states should begin to structure
courts in ways that allow judges and their teams to engage in risk management functions. Bruce
Winick, one of the advocates of problem-solving courts and therapeutic jurisprudence, has also
called for a similar "re-structuring" of courts to facilitate these purposes. Winick, supra note
134, at 58.
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